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SEARCH AND SEIZURE AT CRUISING ALTITUDE: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE RE-BORN FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS
AND FOURTH AMENDMENT COMPLICATIONS
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
KATHERINE STEIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
A FREELANCE WRITER'S account of the events that
occurred on her Detroit to Los Angeles flight on June 29,
2004, Northwest 327, made waves across the internet this sum-
mer, and invited Americans to revisit their fears concerning air
travel in a post-9/11 world. The writer, Annie Jacobsen in an
article called "Terror in the Skies, Again," detailed the actions of
a group of fourteen Syrians aboard the flight, their simultane-
ous use of the lavatory, their apparent use of hand signals to
communicate, and their congregation in the rear of the plane
that led her to fear an imminent terrorist hijacking.' The au-
thor saw one of the men take a full McDonald's bag with him to
the lavatory, return to the cabin with the bag (now nearly
empty), and give one of his colleagues a "thumbs-up. 2 The
mounting evidence of a potential hijacking prompted her to
contact the flight attendant.' The flight attendant reassured the
writer's husband that "there were people on board 'higher up
than you and me watching the men." 4 These people are the
Federal Air Marshals, newly reorganized and super-sized in or-
der to fight terrorism in the skies. The suspicious men on Jacob-
sen's flight turned out to be musicians in a touring band, hired
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to perform at a San Diego casino, all interviewed by agents upon
arrival, and described as "Syria's answer to Wayne Newton."5
The details of the flight were corroborated by Dave Adams,
spokesman for the Federal Air Marshal Service.6 Nonetheless,
this information did little to ease the mind of not just the au-
thor, but the thousands of Americans who came to know the
harrowing tale via e-mail, blogs, or even the local news. Only two
weeks prior to Jacobsen's article, Time published an account of
one writer's glimpse into the training of the "new" Federal Air
Marshals, who proclaim that, "[y] ou have to believe you're
Superman."'
Somewhere in between the invincible Superman and the un-
wavering fears of the anxious passenger lies the current state of
the Federal Air Marshal program. This article will describe how
the marshals have transformed from a cold-war era task force to
a major component of the Department of Homeland Security's
response to continuing terrorist threats, and the growth
problems that the marshals experienced while expanding. Fur-
ther, the article will discuss the viability of applying current
Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence to actions
taken in the skies. A number of exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment have been promulgated with respect to airport se-
curity and anti-hijacking measures, including (1) the Terry "stop
and frisk" exception, (2) the border exception, (3) the adminis-
trative search exception, (4) the critical zone exception, and (5)
the consent exception.8 This article will analyze these excep-
tions from the unique standpoint of the Federal Air Marshals,
and analyze how courts may fashion these exceptions to answer
Fourth Amendment questions in the skies.
The Supreme Court in Katz v. United States, noted that the
Fourth Amendment protects people not places.9 But this article
will explore, with respect to Federal Air Marshals, whether
30,000 feet in the air is one place where the search and seizure
doctrine, and all its exceptions, may be inapposite to concerns
faced while aboard an airplane.
5 Laura Berman, NWA Flight 327: "Terror in the Skies" Raises Question-Where Was
Security?, July 25, 2004, http://archiaves.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg
31290.html.ror
6 Id.
7 Sally Donnelly, My Life as an Air Cop, TIME, June 28, 2004, at 42.
8 See dicussion infra Part III, IV.
9 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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II. THE FORMATION AND HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS
On November 1, 1955Jack Graham committed the first major
act of criminal violence against a United States airliner by killing
44 people after placing a bomb in his mother's luggage in hopes
of collecting the proceeds of her life insurance policy."' After
Fidel Castro took control of Cuba in 1959, a number of hijack-
ings occurred, powered by anti-Castro citizens seeking to divert
Cuban planes towards the United States." In 1961, President
John F. Kennedy created the first United States sky marshal pro-
gram to respond to the wave of hijackings diverting United
States planes to Cuba (typically by Cuban exiles) after the Bay of
Pigs invasion.' 2 Through a Presidential Directive issued in 1961,
Kennedy initiated a small-scale program of eighteen "peace of-
ficers," trained by the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"),
who served on "high-risk" flights.3 Kennedy also passed protec-
tive legislation, including an amendment to the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, imposing at least twenty years imprisonment, and if
the death of another person resulted from the commission or
attempted commission, either death or life imprisonment for
the seizure of aircraft.' 4 In 1974, the act was amended to create
a "special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States,"' 5 which "be-
gins when all external doors are closed following embarkation
and continues until one such door is opened for disembarka-
tion, or in the case of a forced landing, until competent authori-
ties take over the responsibility for the aircraft and for the
persons and property aboard."' 6 To further prevent hijackings
on an international level, the United States signed on to the To-
kyo Convention in 1963, an international agreement developed
10 Historical Perspective: Commercial Aviation Terrorism and Air Marshals,




13 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL,
OIG-04-32, EVALUATION OF THE FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL SERVICE 36 (2004), %w%"w.
dhs.gov/dhspublic/interweb/assetlibrary/OIG_04-32-0804.pdf [hereinafter IN-
SPECTOR GENERAL EVALUATION].
14 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (codi-
fied as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 46502(2) (2000)).
15 Federal Aviation Act § 46501(2).
16 William G. Phelps, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Provi-
sions of the Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1472(I)(L), (N)), PunishingAir Piracy
and Certain Acts Aboard Aircraft in Flight, or Boarding Aircraft, 109 A.L.R. FED. 488
(2004).
2005] 675
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
to resolve jurisdictional problems inherent in prosecuting air-
line hijackings. 17
Although the number of hijackings dropped in the period
from 1962 to 1967 to a low of one per year, problems again
surged in 1968 and 1969, with twenty-two and forty hijacking
incidents, respectively.'" The first hijacking event in this series
was committed by a United States Marine, who made an unsuc-
cessful attempt to hijack a military flight out of South Vietnam.1 9
The remainder of the incidents occurring during this time pe-
riod involved United States flights hijacked to Cuba; flight crews
were instructed simply "not to resist hijackers.120 Beginning in
October of 1968, a Federal Aviation Administration task force
created a hijacker profile.21 In addition to the United States
hijackings, many other attempts occurred in the Soviet Union,
Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. 22 Extortion hijackings by
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine ("PLFP"), how-
ever, created the concern necessary to implement a comprehen-
sive sky marshal program. 23 After hijackers used explosives to
destroy four planes-two American, one Swiss, and one Brit-
ish-in September of 1970, President Nixon introduced an anti-
hijacking plan that included a sky marshal program to provide
additional security to United States aircraft.24 President Nixon,
on September 11, 1970, created the program through an execu-
tive order, but did not define the scope of the rights or powers
of the reborn air marshals.25
In 1973, the FAA began requiring the screening of all passen-
gers and their carry-on luggage, regardless of whether they
matched the hijacker profile, and the number of hijackings be-
gan a steady decline.26 Additionally, the Anti-hijacking Act of
1974 gave the FAA the power to monitor airline security, which
had previously been conducted by the airlines themselves, in ac-
17 John Rogers, Bombs, Borders, and Boarding: Combating International Terrorism at
United States Airports and the Fourth Amendment, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv.
501, 505 (1997).
18 Id.
19 Historical Perspective, supra note 10.
20 Id.
21 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1973).
22 Historical Perspective, supra note 10.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 People v. Sortino, 325 N.Y.S.2d 472, 475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
26 Davis, 482 F.2d at 901-02.
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cordance with federal guidelines.2 7 As the rate of hijackings be-
gan to decline after 1972, program staffing steadily decreased,
and the sky marshal program returned to obscurity. 8
During the course of the 1980s, aircraft hijackings continued
to decline, to an average of three per year between 1985 and
1991.Y'  The nature of airplane hijacking changed from the use
of metallic weapons, now prevented by magnetometer scans, to
the use of undetectable gasoline or explosives."' This period of
calm abruptly ended in 1985 with three hijackings, the most
well-known of which was TWA Flight 847; Lebanese terrorists
diverted an Athens-departing plane to Beirut, where a sixteen
day standoff ensued, resulting in the killing of one passenger
before the others were released. 1 President Reagan responded
to this increased terrorist threat by encouraging Congress to in-
crease the number of air marshals aboard international flights. 32
Congress responded by passing the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act, which gave the Federal Air Mar-
shal program statutory basis to further sustain and expand the
program.3" The following years saw another dramatic decrease
in United States aircraft hijackings, to a low of one per year from
1988 to 1991, and a phenomenal zero from 1999 to 2000."4 The
Federal Air Marshal program was staffed by Civil Aviation Secur-
ity specialists, who allocated 55% of their time to air marshal
duties, and 45% to security specialist duties-inspections and in-
vestigations to ensure the compliance of airports and air carriers
with FAA regulations. 5 The number of Federal Air Marshals, en-
trusted with the mission of protecting United States aircraft in
international airspace, rose to a high of 400 in 1987, and slowly
declined to a low of only thirty-three active marshals by Septem-
ber 11, 2001.6
27 Anti-hijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 409 (1974) (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 46501, 44901 (2000)).
28 Historical Perspective, supra note 10.
29 Rogers, supra note 17, at 506.
"0 1d.
Kent C. Krause, Putting the Transportation Security Administration in His-
torical Context, 68J. Air L. & Corn. 233, 238 (2003).
32 Historical Perspective, supra note 10.
33 Id.
'4 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aviation Security: The Role of Law in the War Against
Terrorism, 41 COLLM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 649, 655 (2003).
,15 Historical Perspective, supra note 10.
36 i.
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III. FEDERAL AIR MARSHALL SERVICE AFTER
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
Immediately after the September 11 hijackings, the Federal
Air Marshal Service ("FAMS" or the "Service") grew exponen-
tially. President Bush authorized an increase in the number of
active marshals and FAMS received over 200,000 applications. 7
While the current number of marshals is classified, it is esti-
mated to be in the thousands.38 On November 19, 2001, Con-
gress enacted the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 39
which dramatically expanded the Service's mission and
workforce and transferred authority over the Service from the
Federal Aviation Administration to the Transportation Security
Administration ("TSA"). 4° The Aviation and Transportation of
2001 Security Act allowed deployment of Federal Air Marshals
on selected flights and required this deployment on all flights
determined to present high security risks.41 With the expansion
of the Service came a commensurate budgetary increase from
$4.4 million for the 2001 fiscal year to $545 million for 2003.42
The Deputy Secretary of Transportation responded to the legis-
lation by setting a goal of hiring, training, and deploying
thousands of new air marshals by July 1, 2002.43
A. ADMINISTRATIVE & STRUCTURAL CHANGES TO FAMS
From September 11, 2001 to 2003, the FAMS went through
another series of rapid administrative changes, creating some
concern as to the effectiveness of the newly empowered service.
After the passage of the Homeland Security Act, the FAMS
moved again, with the TSA from the Department of Transporta-
tion to the newly created Department of Homeland Security
37 Federal Air Marshal Serv., http://www.ice.gov/graphics/fams/index.htm
(last visited Oct. 14, 2005) [hereinafter ICE Federal Air Marshal Overview].
38 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-242, AVIATION SECUR-
ITY: FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL SERVICE IS ADDRESSING CHALLENGES OF ITS EXPANDED
MISSION AND WORK FORCE, BUT ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED, (Nov. 2003), http:/
/www.gao.gov/new.items/d04242.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT, November
2003].
39 Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 105,
115 Stat. 597, 606-607 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44917 (Supp.
2004)) [hereinafter ATSA].
40 GAO REPORT, November 2003, supra note 38, at 1.
41 ATSA § 1.
42 GAO REPORT, November 2003, supra note 38, at 4.
43 GAO REPORT, November 2003, supra note 38, at 1.
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("DHS") on March 1, 2003.1' Soon thereafter, in December of
2003, the Service moved from the TSA to the Bureau of Customs
and Immigration Enforcement ("ICE").45 A classified number of
the thousands of air marshal applicants were screened, hired,
trained, certified, and deployed on flights around the world. To-
day the FAMS serves as a key component of ICE, "the largest
investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security, in
the war against terrorism."46 ICE states that this move "offers the
Air Marshal Service multiple law enforcement resources, such as
additional access to intelligence, better coordination with other
enforcement agencies, and broader training opportunities. 41
ICE includes, in addition to the marshals, immigration and cus-
toms agents, with the hope of eventual cross-training to create a
"surge capacity" for responding to security threats."8 FAMS also
expanded its mission, now aspiring "to be responsible for and
protect air security and promote public confidence in our na-
tion's civil aviation system through the effective deployment of
Federal Air Marshals in order to detect, deter and defeat hostile
acts targeting U.S. air carriers, airports, passengers and crews. 4 1
The previous mission of FAMS was more limited-to prevent
hijackings only on international flights. 50
In order to perform their new duties, marshals are issued per-
sonal digital assistants ("PDAs"), which are used during flights to
transmit Surveillance Detection Reports, or observations of sus-
picious activities. These reports are then transmitted to the Tac-
tical Information Branch of the Federal Air Marshal Service,
which catalogs the reports in databases to determine trends in
suspicious activities. The Service analyzes the reports with the
goal of preventing future attacks in their infancy. 51 This collec-
tion technique is also expected to aid in the ultimate mission of
the newly expanded service, stopping potential hijacking ma-
44 The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.L. 107-296, § 403(2), 116 Stat.
2135, 2205 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 203(2) (2002)).
45 PREss RELEASE, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Secretary Ridge
Announces Official Transfer of Federal Air Marshal Service to ICE (Dec. 3,
2003), http://www.ice.gov/graphics/news/newsreleases/articles/FAMSTransfer
NewsRelease. pdf.




50 GAO REPORT, November 2003, supra note 38, at 1.
51 Surveillance Detection System: Tactical Information Sharing, http://www.
ice.gov/graphics/fams/surveillance.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2005).
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neuvers while in flight as necessary. Aside from the prevention
of terrorism, marshals have been tapped to aid in the recovery
of kidnapped or. abducted children as part of the "Amber Alert"
system, and identify those children who may be transported on
passenger aircraft. 52 As this article will discuss further, such addi-
tional goals may further compromise the already strained Ser-
vice to effectively combat terrorism in the skies, if its attention is
devoted to other, albeit legitimate, federal concerns.
B. HIRING, TRAINING, AND RETENTION ISSUES
In order to meet its new mission, the Service had to rapidly
implement new policies and procedures and face the demand of
hiring thousands of new marshals in a period of months. Execu-
tive Order 12968, 51 passed in 1995, authorized the temporary
use of interim security clearances, allowing preliminary back-
ground checks to be accomplished within 24 hours.5 4 Many sug-
gest, however, that the rapid hire of thousands of marshals has
compromised the ability of the Service to meet its goals. Even
the FAMS director, Thomas Quinn, indicated that he would
"certainly" prefer that new hires were not placed on flights
before extensive background checks were completed.55 In order
to hire and retain a sufficient number of marshals, applicants
have not been required to pass certain marksmanship courses,
and there exist reports that many new hires were given guns and
placed on flights before FAMS completed more extensive back-
ground checks.56
Even as more extensive screenings are conducted, many have
questioned whether the Service is selective enough. The Avia-
tion and Transportation Security Act requires the TSA to raise
suitability standards for airports, but made no such requirement
for FAMS. 57 After FAMS management conducted a random re-
52 Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Homeland Secur-
ity Announces New Milestones in its Global Effort to Combat Child Sex
Predators, Measures Include Publicity Campaign and Pact with National Child
Protection Group (Jan. 29, 2004), http://www.ice.gov/graphics/news/new-
sreleases/articles/OpPredatorNewMilestonesLARel.htm.
53 Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245 (Aug. 7, 1995) (authorizing
agencies to grant access to classified information to employees as full investiga-
tion proceeds).
54 GAO REPORT, November 2003, supra note 38, at 7.
55 Blake Morrison, Air Marshal Program in Disarray Insiders Say USA TODAY, Aug.
15, 2002, at 1.
56 Id.
57 ATSA § 111, 49 U.S.C. § 44917 (2001).
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view of 504 applicants who had passed clearance for an employ-
ment offer, 161 of these air marshal applications contained
information suggesting "adjudication was lenient or questiona-
ble," citing "financial, employment, and criminal" concerns.
Sixty-two applicants had been arrested or faced allegations of
misconduct, with alleged domestic violence and assault account-
ing for 58%, followed by driving under the influence of alcohol
and sexual harassment complaints as leading concerns. In one
particularly questionable incident, FAMS made no additional in-
quiry before approving an applicant who was denied a gun per-
mit by the State of New York.6"
Reportedly, a high number of failing scores on the marksman-
ship test precipitated the test's elimination in March 2002, in
order to quickly get more marshals on more flights."' Passing
the difficult marksmanship test would require potential mar-
shals to "demonstrate their speed and accuracy in a confined
environment similar to the environment on board an aircraft. 6 2
The training for the new marshals also eliminated a five-week
course which included emergency evacuation and flight simula-
tor training, components that nearly all would agree are essen-
tial for the new marshals to adequately ensure safety on
passenger aircraft."3 Currently, training for air marshal candi-
dates includes a two-phase training course: the first phase in-
cludes seven weeks of basic law enforcement officer training,
including constitutional law instruction; the second phase em-
phasizes advanced firearm and defensive weapons proficiency."4
Despite the over 200,000 applicants, retention rates for the
new marshals have proved both problematic and costly. The esti-
mated cost of hiring and training a new marshal is $40,275, yet
four to ten percent of the new marshals have resigned from the
Service since September of 2001Y Former marshals who have
separated from the program have voiced numerous complaints,
including disorganized work schedules, overwork and fatigue,
problems with dress code, and being forced to fly alone,
58 INSPECTOR GENERAL EVALUATION, supra note 13, at 8.
59 Id.
(( Id. at 9.
bi Morrison, supra note 55.
62 GAO REPORT, November 2003, supra note 38, at 11.
63 Jd.
64 Training: Federal Air Marshal Service, http://www.ice.gov/graphics/fams/
training.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2005).
65 GAO REPORT, November 2003, supra note 38, at 18, 19.
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prompting fears that the marshal could easily be overcome and
disarmed by a terrorist if discovered.66 Many marshals express
concern that they must accept any seat an airline offers, even if
it is not "tactically sound," a policy Billie Vincent, former direc-
tor of security for the FAA, decried as "idiocy."67 American Air-
lines employees have been overheard saying that "air marshals
have been causing a nuisance all week," compromising the ano-
nymity of the marshals, and saying that airlines were sick of "air
marshals taking high-revenue seats. '68 Reports state further that
internal policies require air marshals to continue their mission
even if their cover has been blown, which may give an unarmed
terrorist the ability to obtain a weapon onboard a flight.69
This body of findings, taken largely from internal government
investigations, brings greater weight to concerns voiced by those
such as Jacobsen since the "reinvigoration" of the FAMS after
September 11, 2001. Much greater faith in the FAMS seemed
evident in October of 2001, where polled air travelers cited the
presence of air marshals on flights of equal importance as ar-
mor-reinforced cockpit doors.7 ° Public and political support for
the Air Marshals continues, and FAMS received special mention
from President Bush in his 2005 State of the Union Address as
they joined police and firefighters as among those "working
every day to make our homeland safer."71 Yet, while there are
over 35,000 flights every day in the United States, it is estimated
that air marshals only cover, at most, ten percent of flights.7 2 In
fact the number of air marshals is on the decline, as former
Homeland Security Chief Tom Ridge acknowledged to a House
Appropriations Committee in 2004 with the less than reassuring
suggestion that additional security could be provided by federal
law-enforcement officials "traveling on government time. '73 The
incongruence between the rapid hiring process and subsequent
66 Blake Morrison, Air Marshals Charge New Policies Could Endanger Passengers;
Anti-hijacking Program Mismanaged, Many Say, USA TODAY, Dec. 19, 2002, at 2.
67 Id.
68 Blake Morrison, Airline Allegedly Hindered Marshals, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 2002.
69 Id.
70 Press Release, J.D. Power and Associates, J.D. Power and Associates and Ya-
hoo! Inc. Report: Nearly Two-Thirds of Americans "Already Comfortable" with
Flying Again (Oct. 23, 2001), http://docs.yahoo.com/docs/pr/release844.html.
71 President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Feb. 2, 2005) http:/
/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-1 1.html.





cutbacks leaves one to question whether the FAMS can effec-
tively increase security instead of serving as a mere figurehead
for the panoply of post-September 11, 2001 safety initiatives.
C. CONDUCT ISSUES
Inadequate hiring techniques and poor retention rates aside,
the FAMS has also experienced problems with the active mar-
shals. Between October 2001 and July 2003, the Service col-
lected data on almost 600 reports of misconduct by air marshals,
classified into over forty categories, with abuses ranging from
"insubordination or failure to follow orders" to "loss of govern-
ment property" and "abuse of government credit cards."74 Also
noted were repeated incidents of abusiveness towards airline
personnel during boarding.75 As of 2002, at least three incidents
involving the conduct of individual marshals were under investi-
gation by federal authorities, ranging from the discharge of a
weapon in a Las Vegas hotel, leaving a gun in a United Airlines
lavatory (later discovered by a passenger), and the removal of a
marshal from a flight for smelling of alcohol.7 6
While these reports are distressing to those who have placed
confidence in the air marshals' ability to adequately protect air-
craft passengers, it ought to be noted that when the job of an air
marshal and other agencies charged with the protection of the
public is done correctly, there is no news to report. Marshals
have reported 2,083 mission-related incidents from September
15, 2001 to September 16, 2003, ranging from reports of suspi-
cious persons, to medical problems, searches, and arrests.77
While AnnieJacobsen was dismayed by the lack of action from
marshals on her frightening flight, at least 28 arrests or detain-
ments were made by or at the request of air marshals between
September of 2001 and September of 2003.78 Recently, on
Northwest Airlines Flight 1057 from Pittsburgh to the Twin Cit-
ies, an air marshal arrested a woman for threatening to kill him
after he moved her to the rear of the plane for making rude
comments to fellow passengers.7 1 She was arrested and hand-
74 GAO REPORT, November 2003, supra note 38, at 18.
75 Id.
76 Morrison, supra note 55.
77 GAO REPORT, November 2003, supra note 38, at 39.
78 Id.
79 Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Woman Charged
with Assaulting Federal Air Marshal (Dec. 31, 2003), http://www.ice.gov/graph-
ics/ news/newsreleases/articles/fams 123103.h tm.
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cuffed after she hit and attempted to choke the air marshal, and
she was turned over to police in Minneapolis. 0 In a similar
story, a 36-year old Greek man was arrested by Air Marshals after
assaulting another passenger and verbally threatening the pilot;
the Athens-bound flight was diverted to Shannon, Ireland.8 '
More recently, on January 18, 2005, Federal Air Marshals briefly
detained Argentina's foreign minister, Rafael Biesla, at the
Miami International Airport after he allegedly asked the flight
crew to enter the cockpit and question pilots about his flight's
delay.8 2
Although these incidents may seem decidedly minor in com-
parison to the terrorist attacks of September 11, such incidents
test marshal compliance with the Fourth Amendment when con-
ducting searches and seizures of suspicious or disruptive passen-
gers. United States marshals and their deputies may carry
firearms and make arrests without Warrant for any offense
against the United States committed in their presence, or upon
reason to believe that the person to be arrested has committed
or is committing a felony.83 As of September 2003, marshals con-
ducted 12 searches of passengers, made 28 arrests and dis-
charged firearms on three occasions.8 4 While the total of these
incidents comprise a mere two percent of all reported incidents,
this number is certain to climb as marshals appear on more
flights and as tensions regarding aircraft security remain high. 5
Virtually all aviation security responsibilities now reside within
the DHS, and most fall to the TSA, including conducting pas-
senger and baggage screening and overseeing security measures
for airports. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act re-
quires the development of enhanced screening programs, or
Computer-Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening ("CAPPS"), to "eval-
uate all passengers before they board the aircraft. 8s 6 This legisla-
tion prompted the creation of CAPPS II which, upon
implementation, "will analyze passengers' travel reservations,
housing information, family ties, identifying details in credit re-
80 Id.
81 Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Federal Air
Marshals Detain Man on U.S. Flight to Athens (Aug. 17. 2004), http://www.ice.
gov/graphics/news/newsreleases/articles/081 704fams.htm.
82 BROADCAST NEWS, Argentina's Foreign Minister Detained at Airport (Jan. 18,
2005), 2005 WLNR 726991.
83 18 U.S.C. § 3053 (2000).
84 GAO REPORT, November 2003, supra note 38, at 39.
85 Id.
86 ATSA § 136, 49 U.S. C. §44903 (2001).
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ports, and other personal information to determine if they're
'rooted in the terrorist community." 8 FAMS is the only only
aviation security component outside the reach of the TSA.
Whether this distinction will make a difference for the privacy
implications of air travel remains to be seen. The remainder of
this article addresses the development of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence as it pertains to the conduct of the Federal Air
Marshals.
IV. AIRLINE PASSENGERS & FOURTH
AMENDMENT DEVELOPMENTS
Modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has developed
from the contours defined in Katz v. United States.88 In Katz, Jus-
tice Harlan's concurrence articulated the rule that became the
threshold test for the Fourth Amendment. A "search" takes
place when (i) a person's subjective expectation of privacy is in-
vaded, as long as (ii) society is prepared to recognize that expec-
tation as reasonable.8 9 Therefore, when there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy the Fourth Amendment is not implicated
and any search or seizure is presumed reasonable. 90 Courts have
routinely decided that the screening of an airline passenger con-
stitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment." Unless an exception applies, searches conducted
without a warrant supported and unsupported by probable
cause have been found unconstitutional. 92 Courts have found a
number of exceptions applicable to justify warrantless searches
at airports.9" Courts, analyzing airport checkpoint searches
under the Fourth Amendment's generalized proscription
against unreasonable searches have considered the following
factors in determining reasonableness: "public necessity, efficacy
87 Vsevolod Gunitskiy, CDI Fact Sheet: Transportation Security Administration,
Jan. 21, 2003, http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?document
ID=308.
88 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
89 Id. at 361.
90 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 904 (9th Cir. 1973).
91 See, e.g., id. (holding airport security was a "search for the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 772 (4th Cir.
1972) (holding that use of a magnetometer was a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment).
(2 Davis, 482 F.2d at 904.
93 See discussion infra Part IVA (describing methodologies for permitting war-
rantless searches in airports).
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of the search, and degree of intrusion. ' 9 As Judge Friendly
noted in United States v. Edwards, "when the risk is the jeopardy
to thousands of human lives ... the danger alone meets the test
of reasonableness. 9 5 This section will analyze theories used to
support searches of persons at airports before applying these
theories to an in-flight search and seizure by Federal Air
Marshals.
A. TERRY STOP AND FRISK
In Terry v. Ohio, the Court articulated a new standard for de-
termining what constitutes a seizure during citizen encounters
with police officers. 96 In Terry, an undercover police officer ob-
served two individuals passing the same store window a dozen
times, stopping each time to peer inside. Suspicious that the in-
dividuals may be "casing" the store for a potential robbery, the
officer approached and asked their names. The individuals
"mumbled something" and the officer grabbed Terry and felt
the outside of his clothing for weapons, finding a pistol.97 Al-
though the officer did not have a warrant, the Supreme Court
upheld the search and seizure as reasonable because the officer
had "reasonable grounds to believe [Terry] was armed and dan-
gerous. 9 8 Thus, even without probable cause, a police officer
can stop and briefly detain an individual if the officer has a rea-
sonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that criminal activ-
ity is underway. Once such a stop is made, an officer may pat
down the outer clothing for the limited purpose of discovering
weapons if there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the indi-
vidual is armed and dangerous.99 As a result, an officer, upon
reasonable suspicion, can make a stop without seizure and con-
duct a limited weapons frisk without implicating the Fourth
Amendment as a "search."
Application of the Tery "stop and frisk" exception to airline
passengers has routinely been used to validate warrantless
searches in the context of air travel. 100 In United States v. Lopez,
after Pan Am employees indicated that Lopez met the hijacker
94 United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir.1973).
95 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d
667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972)).
96 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
97 Id. at 7.
is Id. at 30.
99 Id. at 25-26.
100 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1094 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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profile, activated the magnetometer, and failed to produce iden-
tification, a search by United States marshals produced heroin
wrapped in foil."' While the search did not uncover a weapon,
as Terry had originally envisioned, the court stated that the of-
ficer "need not close his eyes to evidence of other crimes which
he may uncover."1" Analogizing the situation to Terry, the court
found the search was justified on the premise of a "continuum
of probability" that crime is possible in the near future." 3 The
search that followed Lopez's activation of the magnetometer was
only as intrusive as necessary to identify what had triggered the
magnetometer, after he had met the "hijacker profile" and addi-
tionally failed to produce identification. 1 4 Thus, the marshal's
conduct mirrored the officer's conduct in Terry with similar
levels of suspicion.
Although Terry has been applied to airport searches countless
times, in People v. Hyde, the California Supreme Court concluded
that the "theoretical and practical underpinnings of Tery [were]
inapposite to ... the problem of airport searches."' 11 5 While Terry
permits a superficial pat-down for weapons, this same reasoning
could not serve as blanket justification for the "search of defen-
dant's hand luggage.'"" Distinguishing the airport context, the
court emphasized that under the Terry doctrine, "the safety of
bystanders is a relevant factor to support a search only when
those persons are placed in a position of danger as an immedi-
ate consequence of the police officer's act.""u 7 Airport searches,
on the other hand, are made to deal with a danger which would
otherwise occur only after the plane was airborne (while the of-
ficer remains safely on the ground).'"8
B. BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION
When a person is stopped and searched at an international
border, courts have long held that such searches are within the
plenary power of the Executive Branch." 9 The scope of a rou-
101 Id. at 1081-82.
102 Id. at 1098.
103 Id. at 1094.
104 Id. at 1092
105 People v. Hyde, 524 P.2d 830, 832 (Cal. 1974).
106 Id. at 183.
107 Id. at 834.
108 Id.
109 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (finding that searches
of persons and property crossing into the country are "reasonable simply by vir-
tue of the fact that they occur at the border").
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tine border search includes inspection of a "border entrant's
luggage and outer clothing in a reasonable manner based on
subjective suspicion alone, or even on a random basis . . . and
may be characterized as routine."11 Due to the true impossibil-
ity of conducting searches on the actual border, courts have
held that an airport at which an international flight lands is the
"functional equivalent" of a border.1 1 Courts justify this rule
based on the special need for border searches. As explained in
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, customs officials at the bor-
der are charged with "protecting this Nation from entrants who
may bring anything harmful into this country, whether that be
communicable diseases, narcotics or explosives.""12 As evaluated
under the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment,
the state interest in the prevention of smuggling contraband
creates a diminished expectation of privacy contributes to the
constitutionality of such searches.11 3 As such, routine border
searches "do not require reasonable suspicion, probable cause,
or a warrant."'
1 4
A more intrusive search can bring a border search to the level
of non-routine. United States v. Braks"5 listed relevant factors in
assessing whether a border search is non-routine:
(1) whether the search results in the exposure of intimate body
parts or requires the suspect to disrobe; (2) whether physical
contact between Customs officials and the suspect occurs during
the search; (3) whether force is used to effect the search; (4)
whether the type of search exposes the suspect to pain or danger;
(5) the overall manner in which the search is conducted; and (6)
whether the suspect's reasonable expectation of privacy, if any,
are [sic] abrogated by the search.1 16
Methods of search that courts have found to indicate that the
scope of the routine border search was exceeded include body
110 United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993).
111 Id. at 1290.
112 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544 (1985).
113 Id. at 537.
114 United States v. Robles, 45 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1995) (denying motion to
suppress evidence resulting from warrantless border search).
115 842 F.2d 509 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that asking woman to lift her skirt,
revealing a bulge in her girdle that turned out to be cocaine, did not exceed the
scope of a routine border search).
116 Id. at 512.
688
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
cavity searches, strip, and x-ray searches." 7 When a search is
non-routine, the search must be supported by some level of indi-
vidualized suspicion. 18
C. CRITICAL ZONE APPROACH
A more recent corollary to the border search exception is the
critical zone approach, which defines an airport as a critical
zone, and thus subject to a different Fourth Amendment analy-
sis." In United States v. Moreno, the Fifth Circuit denied a mo-
tion to suppress drug evidence, even after a simple Terry style
pat-down did not reveal any drug evidence. 12 The officer then
ordered Moreno to remove his coat, and the ensuing search
yielded heroin. 12' In refusing to exclude the evidence, the Fifth
Circuit reiterated that, in Terry, the intrusion entailed by the
search had been strictly confined to what was minimally neces-
sary not only to insure the personal safety of the investigating
officer, but also the safety of others. Using this as a starting
point, the court continued to suggest that while the safety of the
police officer was at issue in Terry, in airports, the overriding
concern is "thwarting air piracy which often involves the safety
of passengers and crew on tremendous aircraft after the plane is
airborne with a heavy cargo," and the officer remains safely on
the ground.1 22
The Fifth Circuit refined this expansive view of the Terry doc-
trine in United States v. Skipwith. 123 Holding that a different stan-
dard applies to searches in the general airport area and those
conducted at the boarding gate, it appeared the court now con-
sidered some zones more critical than others. 24 After Skipwith
presented himself for boarding, stated he had no identification,
and admitted he was using an alias, he followed the marshal to
be searched, resulting in the discovery of cocaine.12 " The court
concluded that the standard for initiating a search at the board-
ing gate would be similar to that of an international border,
117 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 (denying motion to suppress evidence
resulting from detention until a rectal examination produced a balloon of
cocaine).
11s See Ad.
19 United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 51 (5th Cir. 1973).
120 Id. at 46.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 47.
123 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).
124 Id. at 1274.
125 Id. at 1273-74.
2005] 689
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
even for a domestic flight.' 26 This conclusion both expands and
limits the decision in Moreno. It narrows Moreno in that the
search is limited to the point where one boards the aircraft,
eliminating from search persons merely passing through. Thus,
under this new standard, the search of Moreno would have been
unreasonable because it occurred in an airport bathroom. 127
The decision expands Moreno by articulating that passengers
presenting themselves for boarding are subject to search on the
basis of "mere suspicion" and nothing more. 128
D. THE ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH EXCEPTION
Another avenue courts have used to find exception to Fourth
Amendment protections is the administrative search. An admin-
istrative search is an examination conducted by the government
in an effort to supervise a regulated activity. 129 The FAA is re-
quired to screen "all passengers and property that will be carried
in the cabin of an aircraft . . .before boarding.3 ° The Davis
court rationalized such procedures on a deterrence theory, ex-
plaining that
"screening searches of airline passengers are conducted as part
of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administra-
tive purpose, namely, to prevent the carrying of weapons or ex-
plosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent hijackings. The
essential purpose of the scheme is not to detect weapons or ex-
plosives or to apprehend those who carry them, but to deter per-
sons carrying such material from seeking to board at all.131
The administrative search approach was applied in Davis,
where a passenger who was late for a flight had his briefcase
inspected by an airline employee, resulting in the discovery of a
weapon.132 The Supreme Court has indicated approval of such
searches, noting that where "the possible harm against which
the Government seeks to guard is substantial, the need to pre-
vent its occurrence furnishes an ample justification for reasona-
126 Id. at 1276.
127 Moreno, 475 F.2d at 50.
128 Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1276.
129 John Rogers, Bombs, Borders, and Boarding: Combating International Terrorism
at United States Airports and the Fourth Amendment, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv.
501, 524 (1997).
130 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a) (2000).
131 United States v. Davis, 42 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973).
132 Id. at 896.
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ble searches calculated to advance the Government's goal."'' 13
This justification, admittedly, can certainly stretch the Fourth
Amendment to its furthest edges. However, nearly all would rec-
ognize after the events of September 11, 2001, the possible
harm is certainly substantial enough to allow such limited
searches.
E. CONSENT EXCEPTION
When a person voluntarily relinquishes his or her Fourth
Amendment rights, police are free to conduct searches and
seizures.114 The determination of whether or not consent to
search was "voluntary" or the product of express or implied du-
ress or coercion, is a fact question to be determined from the
totality of the circumstances.1 5 In order to determine voluntary
consent, there must be a balancing of two competing interests:
"the legitimate need for such searches and the equally impor-
tant requirement of assuring the absence of coercion." '36 There
exist in this doctrine, however, two very slippery tenets: (1) con-
sent may be either express or implied,'3 7 and (2) police need
not notify persons they are free to go before consent is consid-
ered voluntary. 1 8 The inquiry to be made by courts in determin-
ing whether consent was given is simply "whether a reasonable
person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or other-
wise terminate the encounter."' 9
When a person is questioned, remains free to ignore the of-
ficer's questions, and leaves the encounter, "there [has] . . .
been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would
under the Constitution require some particularized and objec-
tive justification. '" ' 40 In United States v. Mendenhall, a woman sus-
pected of being a drug courier was approached by Drug
Enforcement Agency agents at the Detroit Airport.'4 ' After the
agents identified themselves, they asked to see her identification
and ticket, which she produced, allowing agents to discover the
13- Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674-75 (1989)
(holding that the United States Custom Service's drug testing policy was not an
unreasonable search).
134 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
135 Id. at 226.
'1 Id. at 227.
137 United States v. Miner, 484 F.2d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 1973).
138 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).
139 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991).
141 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
W4' Id. at 547.
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ticket was assigned to a different name than her license. 4 2 The
agent returned her ticket and asked her to accompany him to
the DEA office. 43 When asked if she would allow a search of her
person and her handbag, she agreed, allowing the agents to dis-
cover heroin on her person."' As Mendenhall was twice notified
she was free to leave and "had an 11 th-grade education," she was
capable of giving and did give consent to the search. 14
5
Demonstrating the slippery nature of the consent doctrine,
the Supreme Court reached the opposite result under very simi-
lar facts in Florida v. Royer."' Royer, like Mendenhall, arrived at
the airport, and appeared to agents to meet the "drug courier
profile," and when approached, also gave the agent a ticket and
identification with mismatched names.147 The difference is that
while in Mendenhall the agents returned the identification and
ticket before requesting her to follow the agents to the investiga-
tion room, in Royer the agents did not.'48 justice White noted "in
the absence of probable cause and exigent circumstances, the
validity of the search depended on Royer's purported con-
sent."'49 Making the distinction between the two factually similar
cases, Justice White found that "Royer could not leave the air-
port without [his identification and luggage]."15°
Another wrinkle in the consent doctrine applied to the air-
port environment is the passenger's simple choice to not fly if
he or she does not wish to consent to search.1 5' The court in
Davis held that "airport screening searches are valid only if they
recognize the right of a person to avoid search by electing not to
board the aircraft."'52 The court did not specify at what point a
passenger may or must exercise this right. 53 United States v. Hart-
well noted the potential difficulties with this rule-Davis "did
not determine at what point in the boarding process a passenger
may decide not to fly and thereby withdraw his consent.'' 54 Ad-
142 Id. at 548.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 548.
145 Id. at 558
146 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
147 Id. at 493-94.
148 Compare Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 548, with Roger, 460 U.S. at 494.
149 Roger, 460 U.S. at 497.
150 Id. at 503.
15' See Davis, 482 F.2d at 910-11.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 United States v. Pulid-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 1986).
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ditionally, as recent security measures have restricted the airport
access of non-passengers, courts have noted the "Fourth Amend-
ment does not require the TSA agents to give a prospective pas-
senger who has triggered an alarm the option of avoiding a
secondary search by choosing not to fly.,,'5. Earlier courts have
found that signs situated near the entrance to the airline's
boarding gate declaring "PASSENGERS AND BAGGAGE SUB-
JECT TO SEARCH" served as sufficient indication that that the
accused was free to step out of line if she did not want to be
searched, even though she had not been expressly informed
that search could be avoided by not proceeding to the desig-
nated area. '5 1 The Hartwell court found that consent to search
may be imputed upon any passenger, as "after the events of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, any claims by the defendant that he did not
know of the screening requirements would be implausible."'15 7
While this leaves little instruction for lower courts applying
the consent rule in any number of circumstances, a near bright
line emerges in the restricted context of airport stops when a
passenger is not denied their personal effects necessary to con-
tinuing to their final destination, no seizure has occurred, and
whenthe Fourth Amendment is not implicated. However, diffi-
culties emerge when the above exceptions are applied to the
unique situation of a passenger already on board the plane.
V. APPLYING AIRPORT SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW TO
FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS
In determining how searches, seizures, and arrests can be con-
ducted in keeping with Fourth Amendment guarantees, some
would argue that the sensitive nature of an aircraft in flight
would eliminate the need for interest-balancing altogether.
Judge Friendly, even in an era of arguably less concern about
aircraft safety argued that:
[w]hen the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and
millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blow-
ing up of a large airplane, the danger alone meets the test of rea-
sonableness, so long as the search is conducted in good faith for
the purpose of preventing hijacking or like damage and with rea-
sonable scope and the passenger has been given advance notice
155 United States %v. Hartwell, 296 F. Supp. 2d 596, 605 (E.D. Penn. 2003).
151 United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1974).
157 Hartwell, 296 F. Stipp. 2d at 605.
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of his liability to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing
not to travel by air. 58
Unfortunately, given both the current state of FAMS and the
frailties of human nature (not exclusive to law enforcement),
Americans are not likely willing to check all of their Fourth
Amendment rights as they check their bags. This section will
evaluate how the Fourth Amendment protections can still apply
to passengers who are certainly not "free to leave" when
onboard an aircraft.
In the event of violence on any aircraft by a passenger, no
Fourth Amendment concern is present. Naturally, once a mar-
shal has probable cause that a felony has been committed or is
about to be committed, arrest and attendant search is appropri-
ate. Probable cause serves as the necessary element for a war-
rantless arrest, "though the arresting officer need not have in
hand evidence which would suffice to convict." 159 "For an ar-
rest, the prototypical seizure, there must be probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed and the person to be ar-
rested committed it.' 1 60 Therefore, in the cases presented by the
woman and man who threatened flight crew and passengers and
who assaulted air marshals, the Fourth Amendment was not im-
plicated.161 Cases more applicable to the topic are those like An-
nie Jacobsen addressed in her article that gave a renewed fear of
flying to many Americans.162 When passengers conduct them-
selves in a manner some may find suspicious, such as frequent
trips to the restroom, or even carrying a McDonald's bag to the
restroom, accompanied with meeting any racial profile marshals
may be using, how can one determine when a search may be
made and when a seizure has taken place?
A. CONSENT
One way to analogize the unique situation of Federal Air Mar-
shals on commercial flights is to liken their presence to that of
officers conducting bus sweeps. Since the Court began applying
158 United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972).
159 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
160 Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The
Unreality, Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual En-
counter Doctrine, 38 San Diego L. Rev. 507, 508-09 (2001).
161 See supra Part IIC (describing the cases of a woman and man, both detained
and arrested on their flights for threatening and assaulting passengers, crew, and
marshals).
162 SeeJacobsen, supra note 1.
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a "totality of the circumstances" standard to consent in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, in case after case the Court has held
that a reasonable person in the situation in question would feel
free to terminate the encounter, or refuse the request to
search. 163 In United States v. Drayton, plainclothes police officers
did not "seize" passengers on the bus when, as part of routine
drug and weapons interdiction effort, they boarded the bus at a
rest stop and began asking passengers questions, notwithstand-
ing officers' failure to explicitly inform passengers that they
were free to refuse to cooperate, and that one officer waited at
the front of the bus near the exit."64 Because the officers did
not draw or brandish their weapons, made no intimidating
movements, left aisle free so that passengers could exit, and
spoke to passengers individually and in polite, quiet voices, pas-
sengers remained free to decline search or questioning. 16 5 This
situation, where a passenger is confined to a seat (although os-
tensibly free to leave), and another officer remains at the front
door of the bus, is similar to that of an aircraft with Federal Air
Marshals onboard. If one of the men on Jacobsen's flight was
questioned by an officer at his seat, in a polite and calm manner
and no intimidating movements were made, it would seem that
this would not amount to a seizure for the purpose of triggering
Fourth Amendment rights, under the argument, true or not,
that he would be free not to answer the questions of the officer
if he did not care to.
Ten years prior to Drayton, in what can be considered a com-
panion case, the Supreme Court found that a "seizure" may not
have occurred when two officers boarded an Atlanta-bound bus
in Fort Lauderdale, and requested, and obtained consent to
search Bostick's luggage.' 66 The Court held that, under a totality
of the circumstances analysis, a seizure may not have occurred,
noting that "[t] he Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable
searches and seizures; it does not proscribe voluntary coopera-
tion." '167 Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, pointed out
that "if this same encounter had taken place before Bostick
boarded the bus or in the lobby of the bus terminal, it would not
rise to the level of a seizure. '"168 Observing the parallel between
"63 See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203-04 (2002).
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991).
17 Id. at 439.
161 Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
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the bus sweep and air travel, she found that "similar encounters
in airports .. .implicate no Fourth Amendment interest."'69
In a potential action to suppress evidence found during a
search or seizure obtained by Federal Air Marshals while in
flight this language could be easily applied, with the reasoning
that the passenger could simply refuse to engage in the officer's
questioning, despite being actually confined to the seat, as op-
posed to the more "constructive" confinement in Drayton and
Bostick. 7 ' To further bolster this argument, it is unlikely that a
search would take place in the hopes of finding illegal drugs or
similar contraband, as such a search would reveal the identity of
the Federal Air Marshals, who are unlikely to compromise their
anonymity for an onboard search for drugs. On an even more
practical level, marshals would not likely be able to perform an
extensive search of the passenger's personal effects, due to
safety issues that concern items in overhead bins, and such a
search could be postponed, without threat to safety, until the
flight has terminated and marshals may act on a reasonable sus-
picion without fear of "blowing their cover."
The question remains, however, whether bus passengers are
even arguably more "free to leave" than an airline passenger,
due to the societal pressures attendant in such situations. The
dissent in Drayton argued that the three police officers created
an "atmosphere of obligatory participation" such that a reasona-
ble person would not have felt free to end the encounter. 171 The
thrust of both Bostick and Drayton concerns not whether the pas-
senger truly felt "free to leave," but the acceptability of the po-
lice conduct (no guns drawn or explicit threats). 72 When a
request is made by a person in a position of authority at a close
physical distance, studies of interpersonal distance and compli-
ance demonstrate that the smaller the space, the more pressure
people feel to comply with what they are asked to do. 173
Additionally,
people approached at a close distance by an authority in a tightly
enclosed space with no opportunity to move further away or
169 Id.
170 One must wonder, if courts chose to apply this doctrine, if the key factual
inquiry in a suppression hearing would become whether the seatbelt light was
"on" or "off."
171 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 212 (Souter, J., dissenting).
172 Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002
SuP. CT. REV. 153, 163 (2002).
173 Id. at 190.
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leave feel discomfort and tension; at the same time, people who
find their space invaded in this manner are more willing to com-
ply with the request of the person making them feel
uncomfortable. 174
While the Supreme Court has held that a refusal to cooperate
without more does not furnish sufficient justification needed for
detention or seizure, for a Federal Air Marshal to compromise
his or her anonymity, there likely will be "more" sufficient to rise
to the level of reasonable suspicion to conduct a search or
seizure. 175
To the extent that these social findings are true with regard to
buses, it would follow they apply with even stronger force to air
travel. As for the issue of consent, one must simply ask if these
findings make a difference in the Fourth Amendment analysis,
or if consent has been given once we reach an airport, submit
ourselves to screening before entering the terminal and arrive at
our gate. Following the case law regarding air travel since the
1970s, coupled with the Supreme Court's holdings in Bostick and
Drayton, the natural answer from the consent exception is that
by the time a passenger actually boards a plane, consent has
been given many times over, and absent a verbal refusal, no
right remains.
Additionally, there seems to be considerable statutory support
to the notion that consent is implicitly given in exchange for the
privilege of flying. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act
of 2001 creates an implied agreement to search, as a condition
of flying, so long as the search is conducted "for a purpose re-
ferred to in this section." 17' For an in-flight search involving the
air marshals, that purpose is the "protection against violence
and piracy," a duty the statute charges to the FAA. 1 7 7 Although
the statute has yet to be challenged from a criminal law stand-
174 Id. at 193.
175 See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216-17
(1984).
176 Id.
177 § 44902. Refusal to transport passengers and property.
(c) Agreeing to Consent to Search - An agreement to carry passen-
gers or property in air transportation or intrastate air transporta-
tion by an air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier is
deemed to include an agreement that the passenger or property
will not be carried if consent to search the passenger or property
for a purpose referred to in this section is not given.
49 ATSA, U.S.C. § 44903(b) (2000).
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point, it seems to quite effectively take the Fourth Amendment
out of air travel altogether.
B. TERRY STOPS AND SEIZURES
As discussed above, a Terry stop is permissible when a "reason-
ably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in
the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." '178 To
determine whether a marshal acted reasonably in conducting a
"stop and frisk," the court looks at "specific reasonable infer-
ences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience."'79 Under this analysis, the safety of passengers will
naturally be a dominant factor, allowing a marshal to frisk a pas-
senger once he has a reasonable suspicion that he or she will
soon commit a felony or act in a way that will place other passen-
gers in danger.
While this analysis of factor balancing seems to be an easy
judgment, the issue in potential prosecution will be when a
"stop" has ended and when a "seizure" for the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment has occurred. The Supreme Court has ex-
plained that a "seizure" occurs when "there is some meaningful
interference with an individual's possessory interest in that
property.180 In Terry v. Ohio, the Court found that a seizure of a
person occurs when "the officer, by means of physical force or
show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a
citizen."'' The Supreme Court has long held that the Fourth
Amendment requires that a seizure of a person tantamount to
an arrest must be "reasonable," and that non-arrest investigatory
detentions will be limited in length as a federal constitutional
necessity.18 2 While these model codes seem to preclude a non-
arrest detainment of an aircraft passenger by a Federal Air Mar-
shal, the Supreme Court has not defined any temporal limit to
the detention period, assuming only that it is to be brief. 8 ' The
Court explicitly declined to create any bright-line test for non-
arrest detentions, concluding it is "appropriate to examine
whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation
178 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
179 Id.
180 Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992).
181 Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
182 George E. Dix, Non-arrest Investigatory Detentions in Search and Seizure Law,
1985 DuKE L.J. 849, 885 (1985).
183 Id. at 886 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 10).
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that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, dur-
ing which time it was necessary to detain the defendant."1 8 4
The answer for Federal Air Marshals in this situation is to pur-
sue their objective immediately after detainment has occurred,
allowing a Terry stop and frisk upon a reasonable suspicion that
the safety of passengers is in danger, and an immediate decision
as to whether probable cause exists for the marshal to make an
arrest, or whether the suspicious activity was innocent. While
naturally, this will not always be an easy determination to make,
increased training and experience of the marshals should aid in
this decision making process.
C. BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION
The applicability the border search exception to justify a war-
rantless search and seizure by a Federal Air Marshal during a
flight will depend largely on whether the flight is international
or domestic. Originally, Air Marshals served only on interna-
tional flights to prevent hijacking. Since September 11, 2001,
marshals are deployed largely on domestic flights, in response to
the nature of the terrorist attacks.'" 5 The balance of Fourth
Amendment considerations differs for those searches not con-
ducted at the border."8 6 Generally, Fourth Amendment protec-
tions are inherently stronger, and therefore safeguarded to a
greater extent, when the searches or seizures occur within the
interior of the country.18 7 Thus, in order to advance this theory
as an exception to the Fourth Amendment, the flight must be
international for the border search approach to apply.
In contrast, on an international flight, the border search ex-
ception can be easily applied to inbound flights, under the ple-
nary power of the Executive Branch to control the persons and
items entering the country. 88 On an international flight leaving
the United States, most circuits have held that the same ratio-
nale applies to outbound, as well as inbound flights.'89 The
184 United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985).
185 GAO REPORT, November 2003, supra note 38, at 1.
186 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 571, 537-40 (1968) (dis-
cussing fact that routine border searches are functionally different in nature than
routine non-border searches).
187 See id.
188 See supra Part III B.
189 United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136, 143 (3rd Cir. 1991) (joining the
"Second, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals in conclud-
ing that the traditional rationale for the border search exception applies as well
in the outgoing border search context").
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Fifth Circuit observed that given the substantial national interest
in regulating the exportation of domestic currency at the border
and the similar features of incoming and outgoing border-cross-
ing searches for Fourth Amendment purposes, we hold that in
the context of a routine stop and search for currency, the ratio-
nale applied to border searches under the fourth amendment
encompasses persons exiting as well as persons entering our
borders.190
Thus, on either inbound or outbound international flights,
searches and seizures not incident to arrest performed by Fed-
eral Air Marshals can likely take place and will require a lesser
quantum of suspicion by the marshal in order to preserve the
safety of passengers without Fourth Amendment entanglements.
D. CRITICAL ZONE APPROACH
The critical zone approach, as most recently articulated in
United States v. Skipwith, expanded the doctrine to allow a search
based on "mere suspicion," but only in a "critical zone," such as
the flight boarding area. 191 Taking this justification to its logical
conclusion, this exception can be applied with equal force on
the aircraft itself. Barring application of the consent exception,
the critical zone approach presents the -most logical argument
for exception to the Fourth Amendment, second only to the
statutorily authorized consent exception. In order to comply
with the competing considerations of Moreno, an air marshal
would merely need to demonstrate that the totality of the cir-
cumstances presented reasonable suspicion, and that the air-
craft, even while in flight, served as the functional equivalent of
a border. 9 2
E. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
The justification for the administrative search exception is
grounded in the theory of uniform search systems that treat all
citizens the same. The essential purpose of the scheme is not to
detect weapons or explosives or to apprehend those who carry
them, but to deter persons carrying such material from seeking
to board at all.' 93 Thus, this exception used to justify the large-
190 Id.
191 United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973).




scale screening will be inapplicable to actions taken by Federal
Air Marshals during actual passenger flights.
VI. PROPOSED SUGGESTIONS
The most critical issues facing FAMS and its future effective-
ness in preventing hijacking and terrorist events reside in im-
proving the overall efficiency and security of the Service itself.
Of primary importance is improved training and hiring within
the Service. Fourth Amendment concerns aside, poorly trained
Air Marshals, not equipped to cope with the realities of an in-
flight hijacking, bear the risk of the tragedy confronted by Iraqi
Airways in December of 1986. On Christmas Day, terrorists at-
tempted to seize an aircraft using grenades and guns.1 94 Armed
guards on the flight responded with their own fire, resulting in
the "total destruction" of the flight and 71 passengers dead.'9 5
Thus, reinstating complete weapons training, and requiring
quarterly re-training for all marshals will significantly improve
safety in the event of an attack. Additionally, the FAMS should
take a cue from the Israeli airline, El AI, which uses air marshals
on every flight, but are instructed in "hand-to-hand fighting."9 6
Officers must also receive training in analyzing whether the ap-
propriate response to a potential attack is discharging firearms,
or engaging in other negotiation techniques.
Next, all assurances possible must be made in order to main-
tain the anonymity of air marshals. The FAMS has been subject
to numerous complaints about its strict dress code, often citing
that the required "professional" dress compromises the anonym-
ity of the air marshals. 9 7 This, along with requirements that air
marshals show identification and sign log books at flight gates1 98
have decreased the efficacy of the presence of air marshals on
high-risk flights. The proposal to allow air marshals to carry
magnetic identity cards, similar to those used by airport employ-
ees, is certainly progress.199
194 Rodney Wallis, How Safe Are Our Skies? Assessing the Airlines' Response to Terror-
ism 119 (Praeger Publishers 2003).
195 Id.
196 James Reynolds, Air Marshals: Lessons from Israel, BBC NEWS, Dec. 19, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middleeast/2592605.stm.
197 See Audrey Hudson, Air Marshals' Secrecy Ruined by Dress Code, WASH. TIMES,
July 9, 2004, http://wA,.washtimes.com/national/20040709-121013-3063r.htm.
198 See Larry Sander, Law Aims to Protect IDs of Undercover Air Marshals; Airport
Security to Improve with Better Baggage Screening, BRADENTON HERAI D, Jan. 12, 2005.
199 Id.
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To ensure all the Fourth Amendment protection airline pas-
sengers are due, emphasis must continue to be placed on con-
ducting searches and otherwise bolstering security measures
while passengers and law enforcement officers remain on the
ground. After years of ever increasing airport security measures,
persons wishing to fly are certainly on notice that both their per-
son and their effects are subject to pre-flight screening, and that
consent is implied in opting for air transportation. In flight,
however, random searches of passengers who seem "suspicious,"
as noted earlier, would serve to both compromise the identities
of the marshals, and likely cause increased panic in what is al-
ready an extremely tense situation for many travelers. The ICE
should continue to coordinate intelligence with other Depart-
ment of Homeland Security agencies, and fly primarily on high-
risk flights, while allowing time for increased training before hir-
ing more new Air Marshals, even at the expense of fewer Mar-
shals on lower-risk flights.
VII. CONCLUSION
The question of whether Fourth Amendment rights are elimi-
nated as soon as the doors close remains to be answered. How-
ever, no matter what exception is used to justify a search or
seizure aboard a plane by Federal Air Marshals, the balancing
test the courts will engage in will most certainly put the interests
of safety at the forefront, allowing marshals to conduct searches
and seizures any time a marshal can come forward with plausible
evidence that a true threat existed at the time. As Annie Jacob-
sen's article suggests, national fear of a terrorist attack while
aboard an airplane has subsided little, if at all during the past
three years, and under the familiar Katz v. United States, it may
well be that society is not willing to accept any claim of a reason-
able expectation of privacy while aboard a plane, regardless of
the Fourth Amendment implications.
What will determine society's returned acceptance of a
greater zone of privacy will be the increased or diminished con-
fidence Americans have in the Federal Air Marshals aboard
their flights. After two years of growing pains, and what is cer-
tainly a fair share of bad publicity, there is potential for the
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency to
create the "surge capacity" it envisions for security on all Ameri-
can borders. It is important to be mindful of Benjamin Frank-
lin's admonishment to the nation, "they that can give up
essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve
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neither liberty nor safety." The only way the twin goals of liberty
and security can be met are through effective work by Federal
Air Marshals, and vigilant guardianship of Fourth Amendment
rights by the courts.
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